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A Different Kind of Court: Africa’s Support 





Africa’s relationship with the International Criminal Court1 has seemingly nosedived. Since 2009, 
African state parties have made a number of decisions that damage the ICC’s project of 
international justice: deciding to prohibit cooperation with the ICC in its cases against Sudanese 
President Omar al-Bashir and Libyan President Muammar Gadaffi, hosting wanted individuals, 
threatening to leave the ICC en masse, and even voting indicted individuals into highest office.2 In 
2016, governments in Burundi, South Africa and the Gambia announced their decision to withdraw 
from the Rome Statute, with Burundi’s decision taking effect in October 2017.3 Although the Court 
has 33 African states parties, the legitimacy of the ICC has been fundamentally challenged by 
African states and their regional organisation, the African Union.4 
Scholars and practitioners have proposed different explanations for the current crisis, 
such as state elites fighting the Court because they want to avoid criminal accountability; 
governments objecting to the ICC prosecutor’s Africa bias; or the AU seeking to assert its authority 
vis-à-vis a UN Security Council that ignores its deferral requests.5 To the ICC’s first prosecutor, the 
recent withdrawal announcements even aim to give elites free hands to attack civilians.6 These 
explanations have different and contrasting implications for our understanding of Africa’s 
                                                          
1 Hereafter ICC or the Court. 
2 Ssenyonjo, ‘The Rise of the African Union Opposition to the International Criminal Court’s Investigations and 
Prosecutions of African Leaders’, 13 International Criminal Law Review (2013) 385; Vilmer, ‘The African Union and 
the International Criminal Court: Counteracting the Crisis’, 92 International Affairs (2016), 1319. 
3 ‘Gambia Is Latest African Nation to Quit International Criminal Court’, The Guardian (2016), available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/26/gambia-becomes-latest-african-nation-to-quit-international-criminal-
court (accessed 3 December 2016). 
4 Hereafter the AU. 
5 Mills, ‘“Bashir is Dividing Us”: Africa and the International Criminal Court’, 34 Human Rights Quarterly (2012)  
404; Reinold, ‘Constitutionalization? Whose Constitutionalization? Africa’s Ambivalent Engagement with the 
International Criminal Court’, 10 ICON International Journal of Constitutional Law (2012) 1076; Schabas, ‘The 
Banality of International Justice’, 11 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2013) 545; Scheffer, ‘How to Move 
Beyond South Africa’s Notice of Withdrawal from the ICC,’ Justice Security (2016) available at 
https://www.justsecurity.org/33778/move-south-africas-notice-withdrawal-icc/ (accessed 7 March 2017); Vilmer, supra 
note 2. 
6 Moreno-Ocampo, quoted in The Guardian, supra note 3. 
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relationship with the ICC. The focus on impunity suggests that governments are at odds with the 
fundamental premise of the ICC, an interpretation that begs the question of why they were so keen 
to ratify the Statute. In contrast, if the crisis derives from objections to a perceived prosecutorial 
bias, it may signify a call for a truly impartial Rome system. In this sense, states question the 
current practice rather than the mandate and idea of the ICC. If Africa’s strained relationship with 
the ICC is instead about the AU and the Security Council, it should be understood within a broader 
context of global order. 
To gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between Africa and the ICC, this 
article goes back to the founding moment of the ICC and asks: Which kind of international criminal 
court did African countries seek to establish when negotiating the Rome Statute? To answer this 
question, it analyses African states’ deliberation in the UN General Assembly about Court 
establishment. It provides the first systematic study of statements by African countries in the 
negotiations to establish the ICC, identifying and interpreting the most salient African diplomatic 
concerns about the ICC: universality and participation; complementarity; independence; and 
sovereign equality. From these concerns, it derives African diplomats’ ICC vision and relates it to 
the contemporary African critique of the ICC. The article argues that African states sought to 
establish a global court that differed in important respects from the ICC that became. This makes 
the ICC’s current crisis in Africa both intelligible and deep-seated. 
The article is structured as follows: It first situates the study in the context of 
scholarship on Africa’s relationship with the ICC and summarises the contemporary African 
critique of the ICC. Then follows an introduction of the data and the methods of data collection and 
analysis, after which the article briefly discusses the international negotiations to create the ICC in 
the 1990s and early 2000s. The rest of the article presents the research findings by analysing the 
most salient African state concerns, from universality to sovereign equality. The article then 
formulates the African diplomatic ICC vision and uses these ideas to understand Africa’s 
contemporary critique of the ICC. 
Africa and the ICC: Towards Nadir? 
Most analyses about Africa’s relationship with the ICC centres on rupture: African states were 
initially very supportive of the ICC, but then became critical of it. Scholars highlight how African 
countries ‘seemed infected with enthusiasm’ for the Court, an unexpected development given the 
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nature and frequency of conflict in Africa.7 Signifying ‘the continent’s deep commitment’, Senegal 
was the first country in the world to ratify the Rome Statute, while most African states parties 
ratified the Statute before 2005.8 Moreover, the ICC’s first three investigations took place on the 
basis of an invitation – the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda, and the Central African 
Republic.  
A decade after the Rome Conference, the relationship between Africa and the ICC 
‘turned sour’.9 As a result, the AU Assembly and Secretariat as well as several countries have taken 
a number of hostile political decisions directed at the ICC project. The crisis was triggered by the 
Prosecutor’s July 2008 indictment of al-Bashir for genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity and deepened by the cases against members of the Kenyan and Libyan political 
establishments.10 While the Sudanese and Libyan situations were referred to the ICC by the UN 
Security Council, investigation of the Kenyan situation was initiated by the Prosecutor.11 In these 
cases, therefore, ICC involvement was involuntary. The African critique can be summarised in four 
points:12 
1. Selective prosecution. So far, the ICC has only prosecuted African individuals. Until 
January 2016, when it launched an investigation in South Ossetia, Georgia, the ICC had 
only investigated African situations. Yet atrocities are also committed outside Africa. Given 
the Prosecutor’s discretionary power, African states increasingly perceive the ICC’s justice 
pursuit as at best biased and at worst a ‘race hunt’.13 They voice ‘suspicion’ about the ICC’s 
                                                          
7 Schabas, supra note 5, at 548; see also Jalloh, ‘Regionalizing International Criminal Law?’, 9 International Criminal 
Law Review (2009) 445; du Plessis, The International Criminal Court That Africa Wants (Pretoria: Institute for Security 
Studies, 2010). 
8 Akande, du Plessis, and Jalloh, An African Expert Study on the African Union Concerns about Article 16 of the Rome 
State of the ICC (Tshwane: Institute for Security Studies, 2010), at 7. 
9 Reinold, supra note 5, at 1088. 
10 ICC-02/05, 4 March 2009; for scholarship on the crisis, see Mills, supra note 5; Murithi, ‘Between Reactive and 
Proactive Interventionism: The African Union’s Peace and Security Council Engagement in the Horn of Africa’, 12 
African Journal of Conflict Resolution (2012) 87. 
11 SC Res. 1593, 31 March 2005; SC Res. 1970, 26 February 2011; and ICC-01/09, 31 March 2010. 
12 Plessis, Maluwa, and O Reilly, Africa and the International Criminal Court (London: Chatham House, 2013); Plessis, 
supra note 7; Reinold, supra note 5; Schabas supra note 5.  
13 Desalegn, quoted in ‘African Union Accuses ICC of “Hunting” Africans’, BBC, 27 May 2013; Dugard, ‘Palestine and 




‘prosecutorial justice’ and a ‘perception of a double standard against African States’.14 
Claims of Court bias are among the ‘most popular arguments’ in Africa.15 
2. Interference with political stabilisation efforts. The ICC prosecutions of Sudanese, 
Libyan and Kenyan actors complicate or undermine processes aimed at finding a negotiated 
solution or reconciling a divided society.16 An AU ministerial meeting therefore 
recommended a revision of the ICC Prosecutor’s policies to the effect that she must include 
‘factors promoting peace’ in her considerations of whether to open a case.17 
3. Security Council abuse. Several requests to the UN Security Council for a renewable 12-
month deferral of prosecution have been ignored or inadequately considered by the Council. 
The request to defer proceedings against al-Bashir was supported by two thirds of the 
international community, but opposed by a few Western states.18 At the same time, by 
referring situations in two non-state parties, the Council acts with double standards. African 
ICC members therefore proposed to amend the Rome Statute to the effect that the Council’s 
deferral powers should fall to the UN General Assembly in situations where it fails to decide 
on the request by the state concerned within six months.19 
4. Violation of customary head of state immunity. ‘The question of immunities is central to 
the AU’.20 By referring and prosecuting heads of non-state parties, the Security Council and 
the ICC violate customary international law on the immunity of senior state officials. At the 
same time, the Rome Statute appears to be internally inconsistent with regard to the 
immunity status of these officials in non-states parties. The AU Assembly therefore planned 
to seek an advisory opinion on this issue from the International Court of Justice.21 
To reform the Rome system and change current practice, the AU Assembly in June 2015 
established the Open Ended Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the International 
                                                          
14 AU Assembly, Withdrawal Strategy Document, version 2, 12 January 2017, available at 
ahttps://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/icc_withdrawal_strategy_jan._2017.pdf (accessed 19 
February 2017), para. 2 and 3.  
15 Vilmer, supra note 2, at 1338. 
16 Assembly/AU/Dec.366(XVII). 
17 Report of the 2nd Ministerial Meeting on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
Min/ICC/Legal/Rpt. (II), para. 13. 
18 Akande, Plessis, and Jalloh, supra note 8, at 10. 
19 Report of the 2nd Ministerial Meeting, supra note 17, para. 13. 
20 Plessis, Maluwa, and Reilly, supra note 12, at 5. 
21 AU Assembly, Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of the Assembly 
Decisions on the International Criminal Court. Assembly/AU/Dec.397(XVIII), 29-30 January 2012. 
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Criminal Court. With a mixed membership of 15 state parties22 and 13 non-state parties (including 
Libya and Sudan), the Open Ended Committee in early 2017 drafted a strategy paper which outlines 
legal, institutional and political initiatives to reform the ICC, the Security Council, and the Statute, 
or collectively withdraw from the latter.23 
The ICC’s African crisis is not limited to relations with the regional organization. 
Since 2009, al-Bashir has officially visited ICC states parties such as the DRC, Djibouti, Chad, 
Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda, although members of the Court are obliged to 
arrest wanted persons. In 2016, the governments of Burundi, South Africa and the Gambia 
announced their decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute, while Kenya hinted it may be the next 
country to exit the Statute.24 In 2017, Burundi became the first country to leave the ICC. While 
Botswana consistently defends the Court, most African states parties support AU and state policies 
that potentially undermine it. For instance, only Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, and Zambia have criticised the withdrawal notifications. 
 This article seeks to make sense of Africa’s seemingly ambiguous ICC project by 
exploring the initial African diplomatic vision for the Court and revisiting the continent’s current 
critique in light of this vision. It shows that the contemporary crisis does not result from changing 
attitudes or policy priorities by African governments. Rather, it reflects a dissonance between the 
ICC’s practices and the court which African states sought to create or thought they were creating. 
The initial support for establishing the ICC stemmed from the vision of a court legitimised by 
universality, participation, independence, deference to national courts, and respect for sovereignty 
and sovereign equality. As we shall see, these values inform the contemporary critique. 
Data and Method of Analysis 
African deliberation on an ICC took place in the UN General Assembly’s Sixth Committee and in 
four designated negotiation forums organized by the UN Secretariat: The 1995 Ad Hoc Committee 
to Establish an ICC, the 1996-1998 Preparatory Committee to Establish an ICC, the 1998 Rome 
Conference, and the post-Rome Conference Preparatory Commission. The negotiations in the 
designated forums were not minuted and therefore do not lend themselves to country-specific 
                                                          
22 Burundi, Chad, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. 
23 Withdrawal Strategy Document, supra note 14, para. 4. 
24 ‘President Uhuru Kenyatta’s Speech during 53rd Jamhuri Day Celebrations, ’ The Star (12 December 2016). 
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analysis.25 Emic accounts of the negotiations were written mainly by Western lawyers without a 
specific focus on African, Asian or Middle Eastern concerns.26 The Ad Hoc and Preparatory 
Committees and Preparatory Commission reported to the Sixth Committee, which does provide 
summary minutes that enable research on contributions by specific actors.27 Between 1994 and 
2003, the Sixth Committee discussed the creation of the ICC under a specific agenda item entitled 
The Establishment of the International Criminal Court.28 
The analysis focuses on African statements on the establishment of the ICC between 
1993 and 2003. 1993 marks the time at which the International Law Commission (ILC) shared its 
preliminary draft statute with governments, while the 2003 session took place when the ICC had 
just become operational. The 2003 cut-off date ensures that the empirical material relates to the ICC 
as an aspirational project. During the period of analysis, therefore, the ICC was a political project 
without institutional interests of its own: it was subject to different state and organizational interests 
and ideas, but did not have agency. 
Data for the analysis is all statements by African states in the Sixth Committee 
between 1993 and 2003 in relation to the ICC agenda item, as documented in the summary records. 
The material contains a total of 148 statements by 34 sub-Saharan and North African countries. This 
data was triangulated with emic accounts and written comments by individual African states 
submitted to the ILC and the Ad Hoc Committee. 
The data was analysed using NVivo11, a computer programme for the systematic 
coding of large amounts of qualitative data. The research adopted an axial coding strategy with 
three levels of analysis. Firstly, an open, inductive coding of all the data identified entities, issues, 
values, and concepts, such as ‘Security Council’ and ‘court independence.’ Second, the codes were 
organized into meaningful hierarchies, typically generating new codes at a higher level of 
                                                          
25 Some discussions in the Committee of the Whole at the 1998 Rome Conference were minuted, but the negotiations in 
the ten working groups were not. 
26 Hall, ‘The First Two Sessions of the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court’, 91 The American Journal of International Law (1997) 177; Hall, ‘The Third and Fourth Sessions of the UN 
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’, 92 The American Journal of 
International Law (1998) 124; Friman, ‘The International Criminal Court: Negotiations and Key Issues’, 8 African 
Security Review (1999) 3; Crawford, ‘The ILC Adopts a Statute for an International Criminal Court’, 89 The American 
Journal of International Law (1995) 404; Washburn, ‘The Negotiation of the Rome Statute for International Criminal 
Court and International Lawmaking in the 21st Century,’ 1999 Pace International Law Review (1999) 361; but see 
Maqungo, ‘The Establishment of the International Criminal Court: SADC’s Participation in the Negotiations’, 9 African 
Security Review (2000) 42. 
27 Other scholars, notably Deitelhoff, also rely on these minutes to understand the negotiations prior to the Rome 
Conference. Deitelhoff, ‘The Discursive Process of Legalization: Charting Islands of Persuasion in the ICC Case,’ 63 
International Organization (2009), 48. 
28 In 2003, the item appeared as ‘The International Criminal Court.’ 
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abstraction. This coding was informed by knowledge about African international relations and 
Rome Statute negotiations. For instance, references to ‘national courts’ were linked to 
‘complementarity.’ Lastly, the analysis identified the convergence, variation, and frequency of 
references. Coding lists are available online.29 
The analysis generated qualitative and quantitative data on the content, number and 
frequency of codes. The relative number of references was understood to indicate an issue’s 
salience. Frequency indicated the level of concern. An issue discussed by many states was 
interpreted as being of concern to African states. The chosen approach assumes that states address 
matters of their concern. It enables a view of internationally articulated African contributions to the 
ICC’s founding moment. However, given its reliance on summary records and qualitative coding, 
the approach does not capture taboos and is blind to insincere statements.30 To compensate for these 
shortcomings, the secondary and tertiary coding was informed by emic accounts and Africanist 
scholarship. 
This article is the first to focus systematically on statements by African countries in 
the negotiations to establish the ICC. Deitelhoff, who codes statements between 1994 and 1998, 
focuses on the positions of the ‘like-minded’ negotiation group, which at its peak had 14 African 
members, and the ‘P5’ alliance of permanent Security Council members.31 She does not present the 
positions of individual countries or regional communities. Other scholars infer African positions 
from subsequent Statute ratification patterns.32 
The idea of formulating an African diplomatic ICC vision is controversial because it 
may be seen to homogenise a diverse continent. Naturally, Africa is not a monolith. There are 
nevertheless two reasons why it is an analytically useful approach to understanding African state 
support, as long as the vision refers not to an entire continent but to a community of practice. 
Firstly, the community of African diplomats identifies itself as African. Its members organize in the 
African Group at the UN, submit collective statements on particular issues, and use their regional 
organisation, the AU, to discuss developments at the UN and, indeed, the ICC. The present study 
takes seriously this practice, while highlighting differences among African positions. Secondly, 
regional claims can enrich international fields. As ‘[African] politics is simultaneously global 
                                                          
29 [Link to online repository.] 
30 Binder and Heupel, ‘The Legitimacy of the UN Security Council: Evidence from Recent General Assembly Debates,’ 
59 International Studies Quarterly (2015) 242. 
31 Deitelhoff, supra note 27.  
32 Goodliffe et al., ‘Dependence Networks and the International Criminal Court,’ 56 International Studies Quarterly 
(2012); Emilia Justyna Powell, ‘Two Courts Two Roads: Domestic Rule of Law and Legitimacy of International 
Courts,’ 9 Foreign Policy Analysis (2013), 349. 
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politics’, regional perspectives can illuminate broader global concerns, such as the nature of 
international justice.33 Importantly, the article does not assume that ordinary people shared the 
diplomatic vision for the ICC or agree with their governments’ contemporary ICC critique. 
Negotiations on the Establishment of an ICC 
States began to informally negotiate the establishment of an ICC in 1993, when the ILC submitted a 
preliminary draft statute to the General Assembly. This draft was modified in 1994, the changes 
intended to meet ‘the political concerns of some of the world’s major powers’.34 Between 1994 and 
2002, when the Rome Statute entered into force, negotiations on the substance and form of the ICC 
took place in the four dedicated forums outlined above. The Ad Hoc Committee met twice at the 
UN in New York; the Preparatory Committee met six times, also in New York; the Rome 
Conference culminated in the adoption of the ICC Statute; and the Preparatory Commission dealt 
with outstanding matters. Additional inter-sessional drafting meetings took place in Italy and The 
Netherlands. 
The Ad Hoc and Preparatory Committees discussed issues and working papers and 
drafted text, rather than perform an article-by-article review of the ILC draft.35 As such, 
negotiations centred on states’ views on various important aspects of the prospective court. Each 
negotiation session reported to the General Assembly through the Sixth Committee, the members of 
which were typically legal advisers from government missions to the UN. In the Sixth Committee, 
states could ‘refine and explain positions that they had taken in the preceding negotiations and give 
their views on the direction of the next round of negotiations.’36 The dedicated negotiated thus 
related dynamically to the Sixth Committee. 
African Participation in the Negotiations 
African states had discussed the possibility of creating a regional criminal court in the 1970s during 
the process of codifying the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.37 This earlier initiative 
aimed to be able to prosecute the crime of apartheid, but was abandoned, pending the ‘international 
                                                          
33 Abrahamsen, ‘Africa and International Relations: Assembling Africa, Studying the World’, 116 African Affairs 
(2016) 125, at 131. 
34 Bassiouni, ed., International Criminal Law Vol. III, International Enforcement (Leiden: M. Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 
at 123–24. 
35 Benedetti, Bonneau, and Washburn, Negotiating the International Criminal Court: New York to Rome (Leiden: Brill, 
2013), at 28. 
36 Ibid, at 19. 
37 Abass, ‘Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa: Rationale, Prospects and Challenges,’ 24 The European Journal 
of International Law (2013), at 936-937. 
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penal tribunal’ envisaged in the Apartheid Convention.38 Twenty years later, they were initially 
relatively inactive on the issue of establishing an ICC. When the ILC circulated the draft ICC 
statute in 1994, only Algeria submitted written comments.39 Benedetti et al. mention six African 
states that took part in the first session of the Ad Hoc Committee.40 The Preparatory Committee 
meetings in New York were marked by ‘limited participation’ by developing states.41 The first three 
meetings were on average attended by 12 African governments.42 At the last meeting, in April 1998, 
‘for the first time, African countries from all parts of the continent participated actively.’43 
However, regional activity took place from 1997 onwards, in Pretoria and Dakar.44 
Between 1993 and 2003, 34 out of 53 African states (i.e., 64 per cent of the continent) 
addressed the issue of ICC establishment in the Sixth Committee. The frequency of their 
interventions varied, with some countries addressing ICC establishment once, while others spoke 
almost every year.45 Countries that have decided to remain non-state parties participated mainly 
prior to the Rome Conference; this suggests an objection to design decisions consolidated during 
the Conference, rather than to the ICC’s implementation since 2003. Table 1 summarises the 
African participation in the Sixth Committee discussions, including by subsequent non-state parties. 
 
Table 1. African Participation in Sixth Committee Discussions on an ICC, 1993-2003 
Year UN Session Participant Countries No. of Countries  (Non-State Parties†) 
1993 48 Algeria*, Cameroon*, Egypt*, Ethiopia*, Gabon, Guinea, 
Morocco*, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Sudan*, Tunisia. 
14 (6) 
1994 49 Algeria*, Botswana, Cameroon*, Egypt*, Ethiopia*, Gabon, 
Ghana, Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Morocco*, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Sudan*, Tunisia. 
 15 (6) 
1995 50 Algeria*, Egypt*, Gabon, Ghana, Lesotho, Mozambique*, Nigeria, 
Rwanda*, South Africa, Swaziland*, Tanzania, Uganda. 
12 (5) 
1996 51 Algeria*, Angola*, Burkina Faso, Cameroon*, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Egypt*, Ethiopia*, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique*, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan*, Swaziland*, 
17 (8) 
                                                          
38 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crimes of Apartheid, article V. 
39 Observations of Governments on the Report of the Working Group on a Draft Statute for an International Criminal 
Court. A/CN.4/458 and A/CN.4/458/Add.1-8, 14 February 1994. 
40 Benedetti, Bonneau, and Washburn, supra note 35, at 29–31. 
41 Hall, ‘The First Two Sessions’, supra note 26, at 186. 
42 A/AC.249/INF/1; A/AC.249/INF/2; A/AC.249/INF/3. 
43 Hall, ‘The Sixth Session of the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,’ 
92 The American Journal of International Law (1998) 548, at 556. 
44 Maqungo, supra note 26. 




1997 52 Algeria*, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt*, Ethiopia*, Ghana, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Niger, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan*, Swaziland*, 
Tanzania, Uganda. 
14 (5) 
1998 53 Burkina Faso, Cameroon*, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, DRC, Egypt*, 
Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Sudan*, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe*. 
 19 (4) 
1999 54 Burkina Faso, Cameroon*, Egypt*, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Mozambique*, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, 
Sudan*, Uganda. 
 13 (4) 
2000 55 Angola*, Botswana, Burkina Faso, DRC, Egypt*, Ghana, Guinea, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Libya*, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, 
Sudan*, Uganda. 
15 (4) 
2001 56 Libya*, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, South Africa.  4 (1) 
2002 57 Burkina Faso, Gabon, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique*, Nigeria, 
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland*, Tanzania, Uganda. 
 11 (2) 
2003 58 DRC, Gabon, Lesotho, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, 
Uganda. 
 8 (0) 
Notes: Countries marked by an * have never ratified the Rome Statute. † as of December 2017. Burundi is considered 
a State Party because this pertained until October 2017. 
African Concerns 
Like those of other groupings, African contributions to the ICC negotiations created normative 
possibilities. Some of these possibilities were codified in 1998, while others remained alternative. 
Together, they formed an African diplomatic vision for the ICC. The contributions touch upon a 
large number of issues, but centre on four clusters of inter-linked themes: participation and 
universality; court independence and the Security Council; complementarity; and sovereign 
equality. African states differed in their view of these themes, with differences cutting across 
regional and cultural boundaries. For instance, Senegal and Gabon held opposing views on whether 
to create formal links between the Security Council and the ICC. However, some viewpoints were 
shared by all African participants, such as the importance of the court’s independence from politics. 
Table 2 provides an overview of the most prevalent themes. 
11 
 
Table 2. Themes Addressed by African Countries in the Sixth Committee, 1993-2003 






Universality 62 26 
Participation 77 23 
UN trust funds 31 17 
Geographical representation 19 13 
Independence and 
the role of the UN 
Security Council 
Court independence 63 24 
Opposition to Security Council role 23 10 
Qualified approval of Security Council role 22 10 
Complementarity Complementarity 61 20 
Sovereign Equality Sovereign equality and international order 14 9 
 Aggression (1993-1997) 22 10 
 
Universality and Participation 
To African states parties, ‘universality’ meant world-wide membership of the ICC. It signified both 
the formal ratification of hard treaty law as well as the softer and less precise ‘acceptance’ of, 
‘support’ for, ‘allegiance’ to, ‘consensus’ on, and ‘wide use’ of the Court. It was a value on which 
African states placed great importance, with 76 per cent highlighting it. Ghana, Sierra Leone, 
Malawi, Burkina Faso, and Lesotho were most concerned about universality, measured by the 
frequency of their raising this issue. Universality was semantically linked to participation and 
geographical representation, reflecting an appreciation of diversity among states. Figure 1 maps 









Algeria, Burkina Faso, Côte 
d’Ivoire*, Kenya*, Lesotho*, 
Malawi*, Rwanda, Senegal, 
South Africa*, Tanzania* 
 Egypt, Ethiopia*, Gabon, 
Ghana*, Guinea, 
Mozambique*, Nigeria*, 










Figure 1. Deliberation on Universality and Participation 
Note: Countries marked with an asterisk (*) advocated for establishing and/or contributing to UN trust funds to finance the 





Universalising the ICC meant making it the subject of the widest possible support in a numerical 
sense: what mattered was the number and geographical representation of states parties. Participation 
was thus an integral aspect of universality. Malawi summed up the view succinctly:  
The principle of universality, crucial to the proper functioning of the court, could be 
achieved only with the participation of all the stakeholders at all levels of the process, 
including the important preparatory phase.46 
Egypt similarly stated that ‘to ensure the universality of the court, as many countries as possible, 
particularly developing countries, must participate in the drafting of the statute.’47 To Ghana, the 
absence of developing countries in the Preparatory Committee ‘would have an adverse effect on the 
universality of the negotiations.’48 Universality was thus understood state-centrically; it meant the 
involvement by all states in creating and sustaining the ICC, not internalised values. African 
delegates’ notion of universalism reflected that of the UN: it was not a transnational ‘universalism 
of people’, but a contractual ‘universalism of nation-states’.49 As Tanzania stated in 2002: ‘The 
political will of States was essential to make the acceptance of the Court universal.’50 
Signifying the importance of Court universality, African states evaluated process-
related or substantive proposals in the light of their impact on universalisation. To enhance 
universality, therefore, Ethiopia, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Tunisia supported making the ICC a UN 
court51, Mozambique advocated Court association with the UN52, Algeria opposed temporal 
constraints on the negotiations53, and Côte d’Ivoire and Ethiopia supported complementarity54. 
Later, Ghana highlighted that it had accepted worrying ‘compromise solutions’ during the Rome 
Conference so that the Court could enjoy the support of the largest possible number of states.55 
                                                          
46 Malawi in A/C.6/51/SR.27, 29 October 1996. 
47 Egypt in A/C.6/50/SR.28, 2 November 1995. See also Rwanda in A(C.6/50/SR.31, 6 November 1995.  
48 Ghana in A/C.6/51/SR.26, 29 October 1996. 
49 Mazrui, ‘The United Nations and the Muslim World,’ in From Global Apartheid to Global Village: Africa and the 
United Nations, ed. Adekeye Adebajo (Scotsville: University of Kwazulu-Natal Press (2009) 51, at 51. 
50 Tanzania in A/C.6/57/SR.15, 15 October 2002. 
51 Ethiopia in A/C.6/49/SR.21, 28 October 1994; Guinea in A/C.6/49/SR.17, 25 October 1994; Sierra Leone in 
A/C.6/48/SR.17, 25 October 1993; Tunisia in A/C.6/48/SR.28, 5 November 1993, and A/C.6/49/SR.20, 28 October 
1994. 
52 Mozambique in A/C.6/51/SR.29, 1 November 1996. 
53 Algeria in A/C.6/51/SR.28, 31 October 1996. 
54 Ethiopia and Côte d’Ivoire in A/C.6/51/SR.29, 1 November 1996. 
55 Ghana in A/C.6/55/SR.11, 19 October 2000. 
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The limited participation by developing countries was noted by many African states. 
Arguing that the obstacle to participation was financial, they successfully advocated the 
establishment of trust funds to finance the participation of officials from the least developed 
countries. To Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Uganda, contributions to the 
UN trust fund would enhance universality through participation. Kenya explained:  
Equally important to the success of the Preparatory Commission was the full 
participation of all its members in its deliberations. It was in the interest of the long-
term legitimacy of the Court not only that Governments support the work of the 
Preparatory Commission but also that different legal systems be taken into account 
from the outset... For that reason, it was important to facilitate the participation of 
developing countries.56 
Advocacy for financial support was successful insofar as the UN General Assembly established and 
extended the mandate of a trust fund to facilitate the participation of the least developed countries in 
the negotiations.57 In addition, countries called for technical and financial assistance to enable the 
ratification and domestication of the Statute. 
Geographical representation among court officials signified another aspect of 
universality. Although mentioned less frequently than participation, it was an issue raised by 13 
African countries. They argued that to ensure universality, the court should have a balanced and 
diverse composition, including judges selected on the basis of geographical representation. 
Although it was left implicit, African states worried about a Western overrepresentation at the 
court; as Cameroon warned, ‘certain regions’ should not be ‘overrepresented.’58 In 2003, after the 
appointment of the Argentinian prosecutor, several states advocated for an African deputy 
prosecutor. 
Independence 
Throughout the period under study, court independence was one of the values stressed most 
frequently and by 70 per cent of African participants. Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Lesotho, 
Libya, and Sudan were most concerned with the independence of the ICC.  African diplomats 
shared the view that independence was an important characteristic of the future court and they 
associated court independence with freedom or ‘immunity’ from domestic and/or international 
                                                          
56 Kenya in A/C.6/53/SR.10, 11 December 1998. 
57 GA Res 51/207, 17 December 1996. 
58 Cameroon in A/C.6/48/SR.22, 1 November 1993. 
14 
 
political influence and pressure. Sudan provided the historical backdrop to the emphasis on court 
independence, illustrating the way in which independence was understood in the context of 
international politics rather than due process and the rule of law:  
the experience of mankind in the endeavour to establish the League of Nations and 
subsequently the United Nations has shown that political considerations come into 
play in all circumstances and that facts are coloured in order to promote particular 
interests. The world’s less powerful countries and those of lesser political, military 
and economic influence have thus become wary of the exploitation of global 
humanitarian principles and objectives to serve the purposes of some parties rather 
than others. 
Other values mentioned in relation to court independence were impartiality, objectivity, neutrality, 
effectiveness, transparency, and credibility, again primarily understood in the context of 
international relations rather than the rule of law. 
 States were particularly concerned with the role of the Security Council and the independence 
of the prosecutor and the judges. They advanced or supported various mechanisms for ensuring the 
latter, such as judicial review of the case selection, prosecutorial proprio motu authority, separation 
between the Office of the Prosecutor and the court, long-term tenure for judges, geographical 
representation in the staffing, as well as states-party election of the judges, prosecutor, and registrar. 
Positions differed over the extent to which independence could be maintained if the court had 
formal links to the UN and the Security Council, but all states agreed that it was paramount to get 
this relationship right in order to ensure court independence. 
The Role of the UN Security Council 
On the question of what role, if any, the Security Council should have in relation to the ICC, 
African opinion was divided along the merits of linking the ICC to a supremely political organ. 
Table 4 provides a summary of their positions and illustrates that most states associated court 
independence with the role of Security Council. The ILC drafts proposed to give the Security 
Council a right to submit cases to the court while also preventing ICC involvement in situations of 
Council action. The ILC felt that ‘in light of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security,’ the Security Council should be authorized to invoke the ICC’s 
judicial mechanism in accordance with the UN Charter. The idea of giving the Security Council 
power to defer an investigation or prosecution entered the informal negotiations later. 
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 Algeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Libya, Sudan, and Tanzania were consistently opposed to the 
idea of giving any powers to the Security Council and advanced four interrelated reasons for their 
opposition: It threatened the Court’s independence, conflated the international separation of powers, 
dramatically expanded the Council’s role, and undermined equality before the law. In terms of court 
independence, states argued that it would be ‘difficult to reconcile’ the principles of independence 
and impartiality with ‘the fact that on some occasions, the Court would have to defer to the Security 
Council’.59 Gabon’s representative was, 
astonished to see that the draft statute provided for the establishment of a tribunal whose 
operation would be dependent on the good will of States and whose freedom would be 
hampered by those same States and by the Security Council.60 
Concerns about the international separation of powers stemmed from the view that the draft statute 
conflated legislative, executive and judicial roles by collapsing different kinds of international 
authority which ought to be separate. They opposed the suggestion that investigations of a crime of 
aggression were dependent on the prior determination by the Council that an act of aggression had 
taken place. This suggestion gave the Council de facto authority to decide the Court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction, creating in the former ‘an immense centre of international power’ authorised to 
both legislate and prosecute.61 In the eyes of Algeria, such a provision would ‘confer judicial 
powers on a highly political organ.’62 
 The idea, agreed in Rome, that the Council should be able to refer a situation to the ICC was 
seen by these states as a problematic expansion of the Council’s powers, which de facto rewrote the 
constitution of international society, the UN Charter.63 These powers, moreover, would consolidate 
sovereign inequality, as discussed below. To protect the Court from ‘political influence’ by the 
Council or from the ‘direct or indirect influence’ of any UN organ, therefore, this group of countries 
advocated a total independence from the Council.64 This position reflected that of the Non-Aligned 
Movement.65 After the 1998 Rome Conference, where the Council was given referral and deferral 
powers, they continued to oppose the formal links between the Security Council and the ICC. 
                                                          
59 Algeria in A/C.6/52/SR.13, 23 October 1997. 
60 Gabon in A/C.6/48/SR.19, 27 October 1993. 
61 Gabon in A/C.6/48/SR.19, 27 October 1993. 
62 Algeria in A/C.6/49/SR.27, 4 November 1994. 
63 Algeria in A/C.6/49/SR.20, 28 October 1994. 
64 Sudan in A/C.6/49/SR.26, 3 November 1994, and A/C.6/48/SR.21, 29 October 1993. 
65 Non-Aligned Movement Summit Declaration, NAC 11/Doc.1/Rev.3, 18-20 October 1995. 
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 Not all states were opposed to Security Council involvement. These states shared the concern 
with court independence, but accepted to let the Council play a role. For instance, Senegal argued 
that ‘it was inconceivable that the two bodies should function without reference to one another’ 
since they addressed the same problem of violence and conflict.66 Some states agreed to give the 
Council referral powers, but opposed granting deferral powers.67 Others only conceived of Council 
referrals in relation to the crime of aggression.68 
 Seven states wanted the General Assembly to be at par with the Security Council, arguing 
that it would be ‘appropriate’ for the General Assembly to have referral powers ‘in view of the 
representative nature of that organ.’69 Niger proposed that referral powers fell to the Assembly if the 
Council was blocked by a veto and Cameroon suggested that the Council’s ‘permanent members 
should be prohibited from using the veto … so as to prevent any selective referrals.’70 After the 
Rome Conference, when many African states signed the Statute, some African representatives 
continued to call for clarification of the relationship between the ICC and the Security Council. 
Table 4. Court Independence and the Role of the UN 
  Role of the UN Organs No discussion of 
UN Organs 
  Opposition to 
Security Council Role 
Qualified Approval of 
Security Council Role 
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67 Ghana in A/C.6/51/SR.26, 29 October 1996; Uganda in A/C.6/52/SR.13, 23 October 1997. 
68 E.g., Egypt in A/C.6/49/SR.20, 28 October 1994. 
69 Sierra Leone in A/C.6/48/SR.17, 25 October 1993. 




Complementarity was another great concern, addressed by 20 African state representatives from all 
sub-regions. The notion was introduced into the negotiations from the beginning, as the 1994 ILC 
draft emphasised that the court ‘is intended to be complementary to national criminal justice 
systems in cases where such trial procedures may not be available or may be ineffective.’71 The 
draft proposed a court that deferred more to national sovereignty than did eventually the Rome 
Statute. Discussions in the Preparatory Committee revealed two different approaches to 
complementarity: The first emphasised the primary right of states to bring criminals to justice, 
while the second approach proposed that the ICC should act when states failed to carry out their 
duty to bring people to justice.72 Where the first valued state consent, the second valued court 
autonomy. In their speeches to the Sixth Committee, African states articulated a notion of 
complementarity that fell within the first approach. 
African diplomats discussing complementarity focused on defining the relationship 
between the ICC and national courts. Most of them emphasised state sovereignty and the primacy of 
national courts, advocating a notion of complementarity that preserved the latter. For instance, 
Algeria argued that, 
national courts must continue to have primary jurisdiction. The international court 
must have jurisdiction only when national jurisdiction was absent or when it was not 
in a position to try certain clearly defined exceptional crimes. The principle of 
complementarity rule out any hierarchy between national jurisdiction and that of the 
court.73 
African states frequently defined complementarity negatively: It signified an ICC that was ‘not… a 
substitute’ for national justice systems and should not ‘usurp’, ‘supplant’, ‘substitute’, ‘displace’ or 
‘take precedence over’ national courts. Table 3 summarises the African positions on key aspects of 
complementarity. 
                                                          
71 Preamble, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, 1994. 
72 Hall, ‘The First Two Sessions,’ supra note 26, at 181. 
73 Algeria in A/C.6/51/SR.28, 31 October 1996. 
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Table 3. Deliberation on Complementarity 
State Sovereignty and 
Primacy 





























Sudan   
Unavailable, non-existent, 
inoperative or ineffective 
national courts: 





















Tanzania (but with 
guarantees to 
protect ‘legitimate’ 
state  interests) 
 
Parallel right to 
exercise 
discretion: 
Côte d’Ivoire  
Note: The tables does not include countries that mentioned but did not define or discuss complementarity.  
 
African states did not object to the Statute’s sovereignty costs, because they defined 
complementarity in a manner that upheld state sovereignty. Importantly, they saw the ICC as a 
court for positively failed states, not for states with imperfect or politicized justice systems: 
The international criminal court was needed not because it was better than national 
criminal jurisdictions, but in order to prevent gross human rights violations going 
unpunished in situations where there was no viable constitutional order or central 
authority capable of halting them.74 
Côte d’Ivoire and Sudan similarly envisaged Court jurisdiction in situations where ‘national 
jurisdictions were non-existent or inoperative’ and ‘when the concerned State no longer existed or 
when its judicial system became ineffective.’75 The African states that spoke in the Sixth 
Committee did not consider themselves in this category of statehood. Moreover, several emphasised 
the need for state consent to ICC proceedings, such as when ‘national courts confirmed that they 
were not in a position to exercise [jurisdiction]’.76 In 2003, the DRC welcomed the new preliminary 
                                                          
74 Ethiopia in A/C.6/52/SR.13, 23 February 1998. 
75 Côte d’Ivoire in A/C.6/51/SR.29, 1 November 1996; Sudan in A/C.6/52/SR.11, 21 October 1997.  
76 Egypt in A/C.6/52/SR.13, 23 February 1998. 
19 
 
examination of atrocities in Ituri province, adding tellingly that ‘mindful of the principle of 
complementarity, it reserved the right to refer cases to the national courts.’77 
In contrast to today’s admissibility proceedings, Algeria argued that the ICC ‘would 
not have jurisdiction in matters concerning the quality, nature, legitimacy or efficacy of national 
courts.’78 Ethiopia and Ghana similarly rejected giving the ICC ‘appellate’ or ‘supervisory’ 
functions over national courts.79 In the event of jurisdictional conflicts with national courts, the ICC 
would relinquish its case. In general, the diplomats assumed that given the national primacy, states 
would enjoy the benefit of doubt; as Tanzania stated, ‘the court would not usurp jurisdiction from a 
State that might be in difficulty but was willing in principle to proceed with a prosecution.’80 
Sovereign Equality 
Sovereign equality was the last theme of major concern, and one that overlapped with concerns over 
court independence. Algeria, Guinea, and Sudan explicitly based their critique of formal Security 
Council involvement on issues of sovereign equality. They felt that this would give the permanent 
and non-permanent members of the Security Council ‘an advantage not enjoyed by the other States 
parties to the statute’ and would import the Council’s ‘substantial inequality’ between members and 
non-members.81 An independent new world court should be free of the ‘political apartheid at the 
UN’ institutionalised in the Security Council.82 The idea of empowering the General Assembly to 
refer situations to the ICC represented an effort to mould a more egalitarian court.  
 In the eyes of some African diplomats, the negotiations of the 1990s provided an opportunity 
to create a new global institution that did not reproduce the structures of sovereign inequality 
embedded in the UN system. Gabon criticised the preliminary ILC draft for lacking ‘principles 
capable of guiding the international community in the establishment of a new world order. Its 
narrow scope and lack of vision of the future were regrettable.’83 Libya envisaged a court ‘that 
could be relied upon to overcome situations such as political conflict and imbalances of power in 
the international arena.’84 Senegal articulated the ICC project as one of international order and 
sovereign equality: ‘The small, weak States needed an international criminal court, to the 
                                                          
77 DRC in A/C.6/58/SR.10, 20 October 2003. 
78 Algeria in A/C.6/51/SR.28, 31 October 1996. 
79 Ethiopia and Ghana in A/C.6/52/SR.13, 23 October 1997.  
80 Tanzania in A/C.6/52/SR.11, 11 November 1997. 
81 Sudan in A/C.6/49/SR.26, 3 November 1994. 
82 Adekeye Adebajo, ‘Ending Global Apartheid: Africa and the United Nations’, in From Global Apartheid to Global 
Village: Africa and the United Nations, ed. Adekeye Adebajo (Scotsville: University of Kwazulu-Natal Press, 2009) 3-
50, at 23. 
83 Gabon in A/C.6/48/SR.19, 27 October 1993. 
84 Libya in A/C.6/56/SR.25, 12 November 2001. 
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mandatory jurisdiction of which all States, whether small or large, would be subject.’85 International 
criminal law should therefore be subject to both state consent and ‘the requirements of international 
public order.’  
  Sovereign equality implicitly infused the discussions of the nature, crimes, and membership 
of the proposed Court. From a self-conscious position at the bottom of the international hierarchy, 
the stress on court objectivity and impartiality did not relate to defendants’ rights or due process, 
but to the fear of political abuse of the Court by more powerful states. For instance, Burkina Faso 
called on ‘the international community’ to ‘guard against any attempt to politicize the Court or to 
impose conditions on it that might compromise its objectivity and impartiality.’86 
 The focus on abuse by the powerful was also reflected in concerns about the crime of 
aggression, over which many African states wanted the ICC to have jurisdiction. Indeed, between 
1993 and 1997, aggression was the crime mentioned most frequently by African states, more often 
than genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and apartheid. Many African states operated 
with four core crimes: the three ICC crimes and ‘the “supreme” international crime’ of aggression.87 
Thus, the view that ‘most members [in the Preparatory Committee and at the Rome Conference] 
shared a clear, albeit narrow, understanding’ of wanting Court jurisdiction to cover only war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide88 does not reflect African deliberation in the Sixth 
Committee. Table 5 maps African states’ concern over sovereign equality and international order, 
indicating whether these concerns were articulated in the context of the Security Council’s role or 
the ICC more generally. 
Table 5. Sovereign Equality and International Order 
 Sovereign Equality International Order 















                                                          
85 Senegal in A/C.6/49/SR.25, 2 November 1994. 
86 Burkina Faso in A/C.6/57/SR.15, 15 October 2002. 
87 Tanzania in A/C.6/52/SR.11, 21 October 1997. 
88 Benedetti, Bonneau, and Washburn, supra note 35, at 19. 
21 
 
The African Diplomatic Vision of the ICC 
The four clusters of possibilities and concerns by African diplomats provide the contours of an 
African diplomatic vision for the ICC. This vision was not coherently formulated in a continental 
manifesto, but existed as a fuzzy idea about the ideal Court, pieced together from the preceding 
analysis of what African states chose to say on the topic of establishing the ICC. Although there 
were differences among African negotiating positions, as highlighted above, African states agreed 
on a vision of a globally supported, power-independent court with residual authority, a horizontal, 
consent-based relationship to national courts, and an appreciation of the importance of sovereignty 
and the challenges of statehood. It embodied and sought to build a fairer international system and 
could provide a check on major powers. 
To many African diplomats, the ICC Statute would lead not so much to a future, 
impunity-free world as to a more equal world. Indeed, in contrast to the Western state and NGO 
vision of the ICC,89 impunity featured relatively little in the African Sixth Committee discussions. 
In fact, between 1993 and 2003, 18 African countries made only 28 references to a court associated 
with anti-impunity. 82 per cent of these references were made in November 1998 or thereafter, 
suggesting that African diplomats adopted the impunity narrative during and after the Rome 
Conference. Thus, to African diplomats, the Court initially did not represent the anti-impunity 
project with which it was later associated. 
The vision for the ICC related to a broader African agenda of restructuring 
international society. There was an acute awareness that international society was marked by 
structural inequality as manifested in the continent’s underrepresentation in its executive body and 
official languages.90 As Nelson Mandela told the General Assembly in 1995, the UN 
has to reassess its role, redefine its profile and reshape its structures. It should truly 
reflect the diversity of our universe and ensure equity among the nations in the 
exercise of power within the system of international relation [sic], in general, and the 
Security Council, in particular.91 
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To remedy this structural inequality, African states called upon the UN ‘to facilitate 
the birth of a new world order of peace, democracy and prosperity for all.’92 This larger project 
gave meaning to the new institution of the ICC and produced the vision of a court that was 
independent of major powers and built a fairer world. Indeed, the ILC’s preliminary draft ICC 
statute coincided with the establishment of the UN’s Open-Ended Working Group on Security 
Council Reform.93 Thus, Gabon criticised the ILC statute for a lack of vision, Senegal argued that 
small states needed the ICC, and Sudan explained the fear of court capture by powerful states. 
The position of African states in international society did not, however, provide the 
only context for the diplomatic vision of the ICC. A second and related aspect concerned the 
‘juridical’ nature of African statehood, whereby international recognition rather than empirical 
government is constitutive of the state.94 The importance of juridical statehood is deep-seated in 
African international relations. In the 1960s, African countries ceased to be colonies not when they 
‘assumed control of their domestic affairs,’ but rather when they established ‘direct diplomatic 
relations with other countries abroad.’95 Nationalism sought fulfilment by international participation 
outside Africa, while independence was signified by the move ‘from foreign rule to foreign 
relations’.96  
Consent-based international relations and participation in international regimes is 
essential to juridical statehood because their absence undermine the recognition on which 
sovereignty is based. When negotiating the creation of the ICC, this notion of statehood informed 
the notion of complementarity as well as the emphasis on participation. Most African states 
understood complementarity to mean a horizontal or subsidiary Court that did not infringe on 
sovereignty; only later was the ICC perceived as a source of intervention. In the context of the 148 
African Sixth Committee statements presently analysed, a Kenya warning in 1996 stands out for 
being atypical. Kenya cautioned states not to dispense with their juridical sovereignty: 
Whenever established machinery was found to be ill-equipped to deal with new 
problems, it was necessary to devise arrangements more suited to changing 
conditions. However, in seeking to modernize traditional norms, Member States 
                                                          
92 Ibid. See also Landsberg, ‘Africa’s Stake in UN Reform’ in ‘Ending Global Apartheid: Africa and the United 
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96 Ibid, at 499. 
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should ensure that hard-won international legal and political gains were not 
sacrificed.97 
 
The ICC Vision and the Contemporary Court Critique  
The African diplomatic ICC vision makes sense of Africa’s current ICC crisis. This does not mean 
that African states are disappointed that the Court turned out to be different than they hoped, but 
rather that the vision explains the nature and depth of African governments’ contemporary critique 
of the ICC. The first point of critique, the charges of selective prosecution, relate to their concern 
with making the ICC ‘truly universal’ and a beneficiary of worldwide support. The ICC would only 
be ‘credible’ and authoritative if it was universal. By solely indicting Africans, however, the Court 
became biased and partial. As universality was normatively linked to participation, the reaction to 
such selectivity has been to consider and threaten a mass withdrawal from the Rome Statute.98 The 
prospect of a collective African withdrawal calls attention to the Court’s political geography and 
threatens to align its membership with its politics of selectivity. 
The critique of interference in political stabilisation efforts relates to the notion of 
complementarity, in particular the idea that a complementary ICC jurisdiction would respect 
sovereignty and defer to ‘legitimate state interests’. This consent-based approach to ICC 
involvement is challenged by the manner in which the ICC has approached state efforts to stabilise 
and resolve conflict. The reaction has been an attempt to carve out a larger space for national 
stabilisation efforts. Where the Prosecutor separated the ‘interests of justice’ from those of peace,99 
African states proposed that she considers factors promoting peace.100 The AU has also endorsed 
the prosecution of atrocities in Kenya, Libya and Sudan in hybrid and regional courts, aiming to re-
establish some political control over justice processes during conflict.101 
The contemporary critique of Security Council abuse relates to the earlier focus on 
court independence, sovereign equality and international order. As we saw, a legitimate court would 
be independent from more powerful states and deviate from the structures of sovereign inequality. 
By aligning with the Security Council and exclusively prosecuting individuals from weak states, the 
Court is reproducing global inequality and hierarchy. The response has been to attempt to relocate 
                                                          
97 Kenya in A/C.6/51/SR.27, 29 October 1996. 
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deferral authority away from the Security Council to the more egalitarian General Assembly, 
proposing in 2010 the amendment to Article 16. In this proposal, African state parties revisited their 
1990s idea of conferring deferral powers on the General Assembly. AU states subsequently 
emphasised the aspect of world order: the Article 16 amendment would address ‘a structurally 
unequal problem.’102 
The charges of violated customary head-of-state immunity relates also to sovereign 
equality and independence and challenges the underlying notion of juridical statehood. As the AU’s 
Open Ended Working Group states, it is ‘not acceptable’ to be legally bound by a Security Council 
decision ‘to a Statute that a country have [sic] not even ratified’.103 This sentiment underscores the 
importance attached to state consent and challenges the Security Council’s referral powers. The 
response has been collective resistance in the form of the AU Assembly’s non-cooperation 
resolutions and its implementation by states parties as diverse as Chad, the DRC, Djibouti, Kenya, 
Malawi and South Africa. By not acting on the ICC’s requests for arrest, the states assert their 
collective power through the combined ability to prevent prosecution by the ICC. The strategy is a 
‘weapon of the weak’104 in the sense that it exposes the perceived injustice, while being unable to 
remove its causes. The legal arguments supporting this dissent pit customary international law 
against the ICC’s interpretation of Rome Statute and display the latter’s internal inconsistency.105 
Conclusion: A Different Kind of Court 
As African states engage in another constitutional moment, that of creating an international criminal 
jurisdiction for the African Court for Human and Peoples’ Rights, it may be useful to recall their 
contributions to the creation of the ICC. This article has argued that the creation of legal meaning 
centred on particular notions of universality, participation, complementarity, independence, and 
sovereign equality. These concepts gave rise to a vision for a globally supported, power-
independent ICC with residual authority, a horizontal relationship to national courts, and an 
appreciation of the challenges of statehood. Furthermore, the Court would embody and contribute to 
a fairer international system and could provide a check on major powers. As the AU Assembly 
notes in retrospect, states initially saw an ICC as ‘a beacon of emancipation’ for global order.106  
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 The envisaged court does not lend itself easily to an assessment of its viability because 
it was not translated into concrete institutional and legal structures. However, it may be compared 
with existing institutions and practices of international law: given its independence and the 
importance of participation, universality and sovereign equality, the envisaged court would be more 
akin to the International Court of Justice than the ad hoc criminal tribunals established by the 
Security Council. In stressing state consent, it would be more ‘old-style’ than ‘new-style’.107 By 
virtue of its complementarity and horizontal relationship with governments and national courts, its 
involvement in situations would be closer to the ICC’s consultative approach in Colombia than its 
confrontation with Uganda and Sudan.108 
Two insights can be gained from using the African diplomatic vision of the ICC to 
understand the current crisis in the relationship between the ICC and African states. Firstly, the 
contemporary African critique of the ICC does not represent a departure from Africa’s want of an 
ICC. Rather, it suggests that African states desire a different ICC. From this perspective, the Court’s 
practice deviates too much from their vision of a legitimate ICC. This vision encapsulates the values 
on which a legitimate Court would be built – values that African elites perceive to be violated as the 
ICC carries out its justice. 
Secondly, establishing the ICC was never just about justice. It was also about 
international relations and global order. This explains why the contemporary critique is so focused 
on institutional bias, double standards, ‘race-hunting’, and abuse by strong states, and so little about 
atrocity and guilt. It also elucidates why governments ‘nationalise’ individual responsibility, 
spending considerable political and financial capital to hire defence lawyers, challenge 
admissibility, ‘shuffle’ ministers around the world, and mobilise regional political forums. Imposed 
ICC involvement becomes a matter of state because it threatens the recognition that upholds 
juridical statehood. 
In contrast to most scholarship on the ICC’s crisis in Africa, the interpretation offered 
here does not centre on the dichotomy between accountability/impunity: creating the ICC was about 
other values than accountability, just as the current backlash against the Court is not a quest for 
impunity. Although this interpretation may seem counter-intuitive – after all, the ICC is a criminal 
court – it makes sense of African states’ continuing institution-building in the realm of international 
criminal justice. The perspective on international order reconciles AU and African states’ ICC 
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critique with the negotiation of the Malabo Protocol, the internationalised trial of Chad’s ex-
dictator, Hissène Habré, and the plans to establish hybrid tribunals in the Central African Republic 
and South Sudan. 
This article has provided the first systematic study of official African deliberation on 
the establishment of the ICC. It focuses an interpretive lens on the earlier African enthusiasm for 
the ICC, allowing for the possibility that states had different understandings of what the Court 
should or would be. By analysing the frequency and qualitative content of African submissions to 
the General Assembly’s Legal Committee on the topic of establishing the ICC, the article 
investigates African states’ main concerns for building the ICC. From these concerns, it interprets 
their ICC vision and analyses the contemporary African critique of the ICC in the light of the values 
underpinning this vision. The study thereby provides a deeper engagement with the contemporary 
crisis and the relationship it threatens. 
In order to understand the ICC’s Africa crisis, William Schabas calls for research into 
‘why, contrary to predictions at Rome, African states were so keen on the Court.’109 This article has 
argued that they were keen to establish a different kind of court. As a consequence, the crisis has no 
quick fix: efforts to re-build the ICC’s legitimacy in Africa will have to start from discussions about 
the Court’s formal and informal place within the global order and vis-à-vis imperfect, juridical 
statehood. Such a process of engagement may contribute to a more reflexive international justice 
that acknowledges the structural inequalities of the current world order. 
                                                          
109 Schabas, supra note 5, at 548. 
